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the independent monthly, Res Publica Nowa. His recent publications include
Konserwatyici i niepodleghid (1985), and Sfownik Demokraqi (1989). The

following article was originally published in Res Publica Nowa, No, 4 (1994).

Democracy in Poland
A Few Skeptical Comments

fter the fall of communism in 1989, Poland wanted to the best possible economic system, then what was the point of this
biuld—more or less—the kind of society that exists conflict? Perhaps this question was incorrectly stated from the
in the West. "More or less" was thought to be an beginning; perhaps the essence of all these Polish problems—easily
adequate description of that vision. It was "more or less"
supposed
viewed
as needless disputes, a demonstrated lack of democratic
to be a democracy. In the nctme of this democratic vision, it was maturity, a narrowness of political interest, etc. — lies elsewhere.
decided to carry out all of the needed and possible societal reforms.
Let us therefore propose two hypotheses for consideration, and
It is not clear, at least not to me, what vision of society spawned the explore their possible implications:
reforms that were eventually imdertaken.
Naturally, it could be argued that there was not any such 1. Democracy by definition means a system which guarantees the
vision, that since the downfall of the socialist system with its central freedom of the individual; but in Poland, such individual free
planiung, no reforms could effectively be applied. First of all, I dom is still not espoused as the highest value, and is accepted as
believe this notion to be untrue. Secondly, it contains a serious such neither by the society at large nor by the major political
logical flaw, particularly in the Polish case. If we are in transition, forces within the society.
then our journey must have a destination. While we may know our
point of departure, I doubt if our direction is clearly established. A
If we assume, based on non-socialist principles, that the aim of
manifestation of this lack of direction occurred during the most a democratic system is to create and uphold the freedom of the
recent parliamentary elections in Poland, and it would be wrong to individual, fostering his or her growth along with imobstructed
blame the electorate for being pohtically inexperienced. I am popular influence on political institutions, and moreover, if we
assuming that the transition is from decrepit totalitarianism to assume that the state's only reason for existence is to defend and
democracy and a market economy. Nevertheless, as it soon became guarantee the individual's freedom, and therefore the public do
apparent, it is still not known towards what model of democracy main exists only as a platform for the ambitious, then none of these
and to which market economy we are moving. What was consid conditions have been achieved in Poland. Democracy in Poland
ered obvious five years ago, is not so obvious today. The theory and was murdered by politics at the very beginning, and so far there are
practice of a democracy and a market economy—as already proven no signs of its imminent resurrection. Individual freedoms are real
in some parts of the world—can yield good results in coimtries with in the sense that the restrictions in effect imder the old regime have
a history of authoritarian government. It remains unclear whether been eliminated. However, governing institutions, busy with other
the same results can be achieved in semi-democratic states, and matters of great importance, have not taken any necessary steps to
Poland could conceivably remain such for many more years to create conditions for the development of these freedoms. We have
come. Poland could enter into a phase of officially declared democ political rights, but indispensable to their intelligent and sensible
racy, in which only a minimal effort is applied in actual practice.
exercise is the existence of tangible political alternatives — and not
The illusion of societal unity initiated this process, with total merely parliamentary elections in which we are forced to choose (if
disregard for the real and presumed social issues, which were we even want to vote at aU) between fictions.
nevertheless sufficiently tangible to affect many socio-economic
It should not be surprising that the people themselves have
groups. Collective astonishment swept the country when the first attached relatively little value to those freedoms. The new freedoms
political cmd economic conflicts occurred. After all, if we had just are still primarily associated with the elimination of legal restric
regained sovereignty and had just begun budding democracy with tions, such as those connected with the right to possess a valid
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passport for foreign travel, or the abolishment of media censorship.
AU these factors reflect a minimalist interpretation of individucJ
freedom in Poland. Recently, in response to a parliamentary initia
tive, Michal Str^k, the prime minister's chief of staff, indicated that
the government can not legally impose media restrictions on free
dom of speech because we now live in a political environment
where the enforcement of such a policy would no longer be feasible.
Freedom of speech is not considered an absolute cmd fimdamental
value, but rather only a legislative fact.
Freedom in a democratic society primarily concerns freedom in
the political realm. In Poland, however, we are dealing with the
gradual autonomization of the political arena. The media tactics of
the various recent governments provide good examples of this.
There are ongoing complaints that the government provides insuf
ficient information regarding even its day-to-day agendas. This is
in marked contrast to government and media relationships in all the
Western democracies, where everything is done to provide the
media and the public with current information — which does not
necessarily mean that such information is always entirely truthful
and that there is no conscious effort at manipulating the public's
perception. Such information has been withheld in varying degrees
by Polish governments since 1989; however, the current coalition
government has gone further in this regard than any other. It could
even be said that based on such conduct the state's democratic
vision has become severely impaired. This demonstrates an ex
treme autonomization of the political arena pursued more or less
consciously by every consecutive government administration. Such
a tendency may be unavoidable, since real democracy is an impedi
ment and obstacle for every governing power group that puts a high
priority on effective and efficient governing. Politicians, firmly
believing that they know what they are doing and why, often begin
subconsciously to develop a disdain for those who are not familiar
with their true motives nor have the opportunity to discover them
— in other words, the average citizen.
Why then does democracy assume the involvement of its
citizens in the consideration of all political decisions? It has nothing
to do with courting the free press, mass media, and the electorate in
order to gain victory in the next elections; it is a recognition of the
tangible rather than merely fictitious political rights of citizens.
Participation in political life is closely dependent upon knowledge
of political issues, politicians' motives, and legislative outcomes.
The entire democratic world is currently facing a "crisis of democ
racy" as active participation of voting citizens in the arena of state
policies, becomes increasingly difficult due to the increasingly
complicated and technical nature of many economic or military
issues. Because of the active presence of the mass media, however,
there are no indications of politicians attempting to escape from
public scrutiny. Politicians regret and lament that they are unable
to inform adequately society about their actions, rather than being
satisfied with the situation. AU the successive governments of
newly independent Poland have demonstrated their contempt for
the notion of political freedom, both in the formal sense as well as in
the practical possession of real political rights, but the current
government has carried this contemptuous attitude to new ex
tremes. IronicaUy, it is very much in line with an old political
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principle from Poland's past, namely "the governing of the Poles
without any Poles" (an idea that brought soimd defeat to its origi
nator, Aleksander Wielopolski).
Current economic policies provide a different example of the
autonomization of poUtical life from societal values, especiaUy in
regard to the issue of poUticcd freedom. I cim not concerned about
the outcomes of various political decisions (the overhaul of our tax
system, for example), but about the process of decision making.
NaturaUy, such decisions occur within the formed framework of a
democratic process, that is a piece of legislation proposed by the
government is debated and voted upon by the parUament, and then
signed into law by the President. It is rather the long term conse
quences of the enacted economic policy decisions which are not
subject to pubUc debate, and that successive governments, either
knowingly or unintentionally, have concealed the true extent of
those consequences. Even assuming that the first decisions enacted
by Leszek Balcerowicz (Finance Minister in the first post-commu
nist administration in 1989) had to be imposed more or less by force,
all subsequent ones did not have to be. Lacking any sensible
answers and fearful of public backlash, successive administrations
have consciously ignored the two paramoimt issues in the future of
Poland's economy: coal mining and agriculture. As a result, we
continue to live in a country in which energy and food are subsi
dized out of our own pockets, without knowing the extent of these
subsidies or whether it makes any sense to provide them at all.

hese are matters of enormous significance for us today
and for the future of our children. We often hear the
reply that the intolerable possibility of economic anar
chy looms as a consequence of public debate on economic strategy
Sensible it might be (though of this I am not certain) but beyond
those supposed pragmatic principles lies an assortment of values, a
choice which some politicians do not realize or don't want to
acknowledge its existence. The choice has to do with the primacy of
the economy over democracy, or, in other words, whether the
political domain's rights are superior to all other values, or whether
in a quest for other aims, especially economic ones, the values of the
political domain can be overlooked. This dilemma could be consid
ered in even more dramatic categories, by posing the following
question: is it the opinion of politicians at large that the role of good
government istoassurea minimum level of well being (meaning the
minimum of social rights, which, after all, were guaranteed even
under conununist rule), or is it rather the creation of such freedoms
as would allow the citizens themselves to maintain their own
prosperity? Is it then sufficient to maintain a state of democratic
appearances while applying an authoritarian policy if it brings
about sound economic results? Or instead, do democratic principles
need to be applied in more than a formal sense?
The kind of answer this question receives, which incidentally
cannot and should not be expected from politicians themselves,
determines whether democracy is really needed in Poland (as well
as in other postcommunist coimtries) and why. So far, it does not
seem that democracy is in the slightest sense necessary for the
success of economic reforms, whose objective is to implement
market mechanisms and re-establish principles of private owner-
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ship. It is not at aU certain whether democracy is required to
maintain law and order, or for the achievement of individual
freedom, since the espousal of this right is not yet valued highly
enough. It is not even certain whether democracy is needed to
control and maintain the reins of power. Large scale political
corruption, reflected in an almost complete disappearance of the
connection between political life and truth, make it impossible for
public opinion to exert any control over the situation. Therefore,
democracy's purpose resembles one's clothing and wardrobe: each
item of which is intended for a specific occasion. In a sense,
democracy is like a tuxedo, which must be worn in order to come to
the party thrown by the European Community, if indeed we ever
hope to be admitted to such an affair at all.
A demonstrated lack of interest in defending the freedom of the
individual as a social value together with an utter lack of govern
ment interest in real democracy are mutually re-enforcing tenden
cies. While I doubt if we wiU soon embark on a course of repealing
democratic ideals (especially those having to do with the need for
the tuxedo), at the same time I do not think that the process of
democratization is progressing. After all, the biggest and most
drastic changes occurred during the first year after the fall of the
Berlin Wall, and the conditions existing in the Fall of 1990 are
essentially identical with the state that we are in today. What will
be the consequences of all the new economic policies with the
equivalent lack of democratic reforms, miiumal or complete lack of
progress in the domain of civic responsibility, discontinuance of the
pursuit of the ideal of truth in the realm of politics, indifference to
the quest for de Tocqueville's ideal of equality of opportunity? That
is the subject of the second hypothesis.
2. Any lack of progress, be it in the domain of democratic and
political reforms or in the realm of public morality, leads to the
creation of a disgruntled society divided into economic classes
and castes, inevitably inviting the possibility of a socio-economic
revolution or at best a dictatorship.
It would be difficult to adopt de TocqueviUe's ideals of equality
of opportunity as fimdamental attributes of democracy in any of the
contemporary Eastern European societies. Moreover, it should be
realized that the implementation of free market reforms — an
endeavor whose aptness I do not question — is bound to cause
economic disparity and limit equality of opportimity. Remember
ing that, one can consider not only the validity of economic reforms
in general, and the need for a social safety net intended to cushion
their brutal impact, but also the behavioral, psychological and
mental effects economic reforms bring, further restraining the de
mocratization of the public and moral realm. I should emphasize
that 1 do not subscribe to the socialist point of view which proclaims
simply, that when freedom threatens equality of opportunity, the
latter must be defended. 1 do not support this view for two reasons.
First of aU, I am in fundamental conflict with such a notion, and do
not believe that under current circumstances in Poland that a trade
off between individual freedom and equality of opportunity is
inevitable. Secondly, in Poland individual freedom in fact does not
threaten equality of opportunity — to the contrary, the inadequate

desire for freedom and the already mentioned lack of progress in
systemic democratization of political freedoms puts the very exist
ence of the ideal of equality into question.
Convincing and universal examples are hard to find, and so I
will confine myself to describing only various outward signs. The
meaning of equality is not only or even especially confined to
material equality. First and foremost, equality means equal access
to the roles that are held in high esteem by the society. Equal
opportunity also exists as an element of what we call civil society,
and call for a parity of means for the realization of one's ambitions
in the public arena. The current state of the post-secondary educa
tional system is a glaring example of the absence of such equalities.
Let us call attention to the following issues: the deficiency of access
— on material grounds — for people in difficult economic situa
tions; the absence of any positive, educational role models; the
scarcity of "good Samaritans" in regard to educational issues moti
vated by selfless participation in the political arena; and finally the
scant demonstration of the relationship between the pursuit of
higher education and resulting social status. Polish institutions of
higher education find themselves in a deep crisis of not knowing to
whom, why, and on what level they should serve as educators,
while the continuing decline in educational standards has given
birth to elitist and private academic institutions, which will educate
only the few. While elitism may not necessarily be bad, an elitism
that leaves in its wake large imeducated ghettos among the popu
lation could produce incalculable consequences, and lead to the
eventual radicalization of the uneducated, ignorant masses.

ll such examples describing the long term conse
quences of dividing society into economic classes
and castes by their nature can only define mere
tendencies, rather than provide an empirical description
actual situation. So, while my next example no better fulfills the
criterion of methodical verifiability, it does illustrate the possible
consequences of a growing separation between freedom, equality of
opportunity, and democracy on the one hand, and tactical pragma
tism, political corruption, and "tuxedo" democracy on the other.
What I mean — and it may soimd paradoxical considering that
Waldemar Pawlak's administration with its Peasant Party coalition
is currently in power — is that the peasants and a portion of the
working class have been brought down to the level of second class
citizens. Obvious here is the role played by the economic situation,
but even more important are the social and psychological conse
quences of this situation, specifically the imposition of ecologicalzoological-botanical garden status to 95% of Polish farmers. Be
cause, from an economic standpoint, the farms are autarchic in
character, and unemployment and lack of any alternatives for
earning a living on the farm preclude the generation of even the
most farsighted and bold vision of the proper place for this segment
of the Polish population. Therefore, the current temporary and
transitional state — as so declared by politicians — is in fact being
consolidated in place, instead of real change proceeding full steam
ahead.
The Polish peasant farmers, after a history of struggle with
feudal and then communist persecution, after finally being granted
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